主题：Distributional robust auction design
摘要：A single unit of a good is sold to one of a group risk-neutral bidders whose privately-known values are drawn independently from an identical distribution. The seller only has limited information about the value distribution and believes that the value distribution is designed by Nature adversarially to minimize revenue. In addition, the seller knows that bidders play undominated strategies. For the two-bidder case, we construct a strong maxmin solution, consisting of a mechanism, a value distribution, and an equilibrium in undominated strategies, such that neither the seller nor Nature can move revenue in their respective preferred directions, even if the deviator can select the new equilibrium in undominated strategies. The mechanism and value distribution solve a family of maxmin mechanism design and minmax information design problems, regardless of how an equilibrium in undominated strategies is selected. The maxmin mechanism is a second-price auction with a random reserve price. For arbitrary number of bidders, a second-price auction with a random reserve price remains a maxmin mechanism among a subclass of dominant-strategy mechanisms.
报告人简介：杨湘黔，湖南A级毛片内射免费视频经济与贸易学院助理教授，新加坡国立A级毛片内射免费视频博士。主要研究领域为：信息设计、机制设计和博弈论。代表性研究成果中，一篇论文被国际会议WINE’22接受，另一篇在Journal of Economic Theory第二轮审稿。主持湖南省自然科学青年基金项目。